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PPE Development and Needs in HMA
by Andy Smith [ University of Genoa ]
A
s written in the International Mine Action 
Standards (IMAS) 10.30 on personal protective 
equipment (PPE), “the primary means of prevent-
ing explosive injury in the workplace is by the supervised use 
of demining tools and processes that reduce the likelihood of 
an unintended detonation.” The IMAS goes on to state that 
PPE “should be the final protective measure after all planning, 
training and procedural efforts to reduce risk have been tak-
en.” To date the “final protective measure” has been to provide 
PPE that is practical but that does not provide full protection. 
The threat posed by the blast wave(s) associated with the 
detonation of high or low explosive is highly dependent on 
the quantity of explosive involved. With small blast mines, 
the speed of the blast front (as the volume of gas expands) rap-
idly declines and many deminers wearing no protection on 
their bodies have suffered no body injury despite being very 
close during accidents. The evidence from the Database of 
Demining Accidents (DDAS) is that body armor serves little 
proven purpose when the accident involves a small blast mine 
unless the deminer’s hand-tool breaks up and becomes part of 
the hazard. In any close-quarter blast involving kilograms of 
explosive, the disruptive blast forces can pass through body 
armor and pulverize the cells of the wearer almost as effec-
tively as if the armor were not there. Polycarbonate blast vi-
sors are also of no proven use in a large blast but are useful 
against small blasts. As long as the material is not deliberately 
hardened, polycarbonate can flex in a way that has often pre-
vented the blast front and associated tiny pieces of mine casing 
and unburned explosive from blinding the wearers. 
It is fragmentation that causes most fatal injuries during de-
mining. Fragmentation may come from the munition, from 
the soil and stones surrounding it, or tiny pieces of the explo-
sive charge itself. Unsurprisingly, the most damaging kind of 
fragmentation is deliberately built into the munition either by 
designing a casing that fragments or by surrounding the ex-
plosive charge with fragments of metal, some of which may be 
shaped to be self-orientating and especially penetrating. 
There are several reasons why the fragmentation threat to 
deminers has not been addressed despite the fact that even 
small fragmentation devices have regularly killed deminers 
wearing PPE. 
1. To provide reliable protection against fragments by in-
creasing the layers of flexible armor or by adding hard 
armor panels would increase weight dramatically. This 
would make the wearer uncomfortable and restrict mo-
bility in a way that could increase the risk of an accident 
occurring. Experience indicates that it would also in-
crease the risk of the PPE not being worn at all.
2. Effective fragmentation armor would have to be ex-
tended to protect the arms and legs because the spray 
of fragments is not confined to the torso. The improved 
armor would also have to cover the face and head, but 
Left to right, the image shows flechettes from a munition, pre-chopped fragments from a bounding fragmentation mine, and pre-
scored diamond fragmentation from a submunition.
Image courtesy of the author.
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effective transparent visor material that could match 
the protection of body armor is not available, so this is 
not possible.
3. The much increased costs would mean that demining 
organizations could not afford to do as much actual de-
mining—and controlling the risks faced by deminers 
has to be balanced against the risks being faced by the 
population who are waiting for them to arrive.
Reasons one and two are based on the premise that any pro-
tection is only as good as its weakest point. To provide torso 
protection able to stop the fragments while leaving the wear-
er’s arms or face unprotected is inconsistent and illogical. This 
is true, but it is not a good reason not to increase protection 
where we can because the PPE we provide is already incon-
sistent. The current IMAS requirement for body armor is a 
NATO STANAG V50 of 450 m/s while the face and eye pro-
tection is 5 mm polycarbonate, which has a NATO STANAG 
V50 of less than half of that.1,2 The V50 is the speed at which 
half of the fragments (50 percent) compromise the protection. 
So how can we justify requiring torso protection that is far 
greater than for the face? The answer is that it is not logical, 
but it was the best we could do when this part of the IMAS 
was written.
There is always a balance to be drawn between what is prac-
tical and what is ideal. In humanitarian mine action (HMA), 
we have rarely pursued the ideal because whatever we do must 
be practical. This is seen as being realistic because many of the 
hazards we confront simply cannot be protected against with 
any PPE currently available. 
For example, this KB1 submunition contains only 30 g of 
high explosive that produces an expanding blast front that is 
relatively easy to protect against at 30 cm. It also has a frag-
mentation body with steel ball bearings encased in a ny-
lon body that most body armor used in HMA could stop at 
a distance of a meter, even if the visor could not. However, it 
also has a shaped charge designed to penetrate armored steel, 
which nothing short of well-spaced layers of armored steel or 
reactive armor panels can stop close-up. 
Whatever PPE is issued, the informed deminer knows 
that it cannot provide real protection against a worst case 
scenario, but that does not mean that we should not be try-
ing to improve PPE so that it can provide effective protec-
tion more often.
The third reason for not improving PPE—increased cost—
is unsound because failure to do “all that is reasonable” to 
protect the workers could end up costing the employer far 
more than the cost of better PPE. In the author’s experience, 
most donors of HMA are open to requests for support to pro-
vide better PPE for those doing the work they fund. 
 
Why Have There Been No Significant Improvements?
There have been improvements to demining PPE over the past 
twenty years, but most have been incremental. One example is 
The images show combat body armor with a V50 of 450 m/s and a helmet after being struck by fragments from a PROM-1 bounding 
fragmentation mine. The deminer suffered multiple penetrations to torso, arms, and head and bled out rapidly. 
Images courtesy of the author.
KB1 submission.
Image courtesy of the author.
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the availability of lighter body armor materials with a tight-
er weave that allows higher levels of protection to be achieved 
in a garment of the same weight, or more of the wearer to be 
covered without a weight increase. The design of a lighter vi-
sor and some improved hand tools have also been incremental 
improvements.3 The ROFI demining face mask is the only truly 
novel advance because it makes use of a very lightweight lami-
nate named PURE, but its design has been criticized and it is not 
widely used.4
Changes to demining PPE over the last twenty years have 
been largely minor for three reasons.
1. Lack of demand. There is a general absence of an ex-
pressed wish for better PPE from the end users or their 
managers.
2. The current risk is thought tolerable. A generally low 
level of accidents has led many involved in demining to 
consider the current level of risk to be tolerable. 
3. There are more immediate ways to manage risk. 
Managing risk by making improvements to procedures 
is known to be effective at preventing injury, so efforts 
in that direction are more likely to yield immediate 
benefits. 
Lack of Demand
Although deminers rarely ask for better PPE, that may be be-
cause they often believe that the PPE they have provides great-
er protection than it does or that nothing better is available. 
The industry needs a PPE testing regime that provides a rele-
vant means of comparing one PPE product with another. The 
only test we currently have is the NATO STANAG 2920 test, 
which was designed to provide a comparable measure of the 
protection offered against bullets and fragments in a combat 
scenario. To this end, the STANAG testing regime involves fir-
ing single, carefully shaped and weighed fragments of a very 
hard metal directly down a barrel toward the material at pre-
cisely measured speeds. The test is repeated at least six times 
with each strike well separated from the others. The result is 
calculated as a V50 in meters or feet per second. 
Almost every part of the STANAG test is inappropriate to 
use when appraising demining PPE. When an explosive haz-
ard detonates in front of a deminer, the PPE is struck by a blast 
front, which the test does nothing to replicate. It is also struck 
by fragments of the ground and parts of the munition’s cas-
ing and/or deliberate fragments inside it. It may be struck by 
multiple fragments that are bunched closely together or fol-
lowing one after another. The fragments are not of a strict-
ly controlled hardness, shape, and weight and have not been 
fired from a barrel. Even the pre-shaped fragments in frag-
mentation munitions tumble in the air, which usually makes 
them much easier to stop than a directed projectile moving at 
the same velocity. However, the explosions that launch these 
fragments can generate a brief heat of over 4,000 degrees 
Celsius (e.g., TNT) and some heat is transferred to the frag-
ments, which can become hot enough to damage the material 
The images show the lighter blast visor and the ROFI face mask.5,6 
Images courtesy of the author.
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they strike by melting or burning it. It is true that much of 
the kinetic energy in any projectile is converted to heat when 
it is obliged to stop rapidly, but some fragments generated by 
mines and explosive ordnance start off hot, a fact that makes 
some PPE materials shrink away from them. 
In 2007, a European Workshop Agreement resulted in 
the publication of a test protocol for demining PPE that was 
referenced in IMAS 10.30 in 2008 but was quickly found 
to be unfit for purpose and quietly removed in 2010.7,8 An 
attempt to create a better European agreement  was started 
by the Royal Military Academy (RMA) in Belgium as part 
of the TIRAMISU project in 2016 but was not completed.9 
One feature of the planned test was the use of a triple-barrel 
fragment launcher so that the effect of near simultaneous 
fragment strikes could be measured. There would still be 
no way of recording the heat of the fragment during flight, 
but this would be an advance because some armor materials 
cannot withstand multiple simultaneous impacts as 
well as others.
The Current Risk is Thought Tolerable
The definition of tolerable risk in the IMAS is “risk 
which is accepted in a given context based on cur-
rent values of society.”10 This is taken directly from 
the definition used by the International Standards 
Organization (ISO) and was designed to apply across 
all industries, not specifically those dealing with explo-
sive hazards in countries that lack the means to clear 
the hazards themselves. Every industry is intended to 
interpret that definition appropriately in their own 
working context. 
The level of risk that people live with during conflict 
is usually higher than it would be during peacetime, 
and this is a level of risk that is unavoidable and 
“accepted in a given context.”10 When conflict is over, 
people often become accustomed to living with a 
higher level of risk than would be tolerated elsewhere. 
It is inappropriate for any humanitarian demining 
organization to adopt the high-risk mindset that may 
prevail in an insecure post-conflict context because 
it is the current humanitarian values in peaceful and 
secure societies that should apply. These are the values 
that those paying for humanitarian mine action want 
to promote as part of supporting a sustainable peace. 
Throughout the history of HMA, the high level of 
risk that is tolerated where we work has been used to 
justify using lower levels of PPE than is acceptable dur-
ing such activities as range clearance and explosive 
ordnance disposal (EOD) tasks in Europe and America. Early 
demining PPE was inadequate and ranged from industrial 
safety spectacles to combat armor and purpose-designed al-
beit minimal protection. 
The requirements of the IMAS published in 2001 went 
some way to level that playing field but did not bring stan-
dards up to those used in civil EOD work in Europe and the 
United States, because those drafting the IMAS, including 
the author, deemed that impractical. However, if we could re-
duce the number of deminer injuries and/or the severity of 
their injuries, it is an obligation for any humanitarian or-
ganization to do so because we must do “everything reason-
able” to manage and reduce risk of injury to our employees. 
So the current risk is only tolerable if we can show that we 
have done everything reasonable to manage and mitigate risk 
and show that we have done this in a way that would sat-
isfy a court of law. Some international demining insurance 
There are large holes penetrating this body armor material, which has 
burned and shrunk away from hot fragments from a bounding mine. 
The material had a NATO STANAG 2920 V50 in excess of 450 m/s. 
Image courtesy of DDAS.
The image shows the RMA’s triple fragment launcher for testing PPE 
with near-simultaneous strikes. 
Image courtesy of Georgios Kechagiadakis and Marc Pirlot.
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providers insist that the minimum level of PPE required in 
the IMAS is used, which implies that the IMAS level of PPE 
is broadly accepted as being reasonable, but PPE is only the 
final protective measure after all other reasonable means of 
managing risk have been taken.   
The definition of tolerable risk in the current edition of the 
National Mine Action Standards in Lebanon includes exam-
ples that may be useful to others:13
“…The ‘tolerable risk‘ remaining after an area has been 
searched, cleared and released is the risk of explosive 
hazards being beneath the required search depth in 
that task area. The ‘tolerable risk’ to demining staff 
is the risk remaining after all reasonable efforts have 
been made to train, equip and supervise staff in the 
conduct of inherently safe demining procedures. All 
reasonable effort includes the production of a formal 
task risk assessment designed to ensure that appropriate 
measures to mitigate risk are taken. All formal risk 
assessments must be updated as work progresses and new 
information becomes known. The Lebanon Mine Action 
Centre determines the level of risk that is tolerable at 
any task. In the event of disagreement, the final arbiters 
of what is ‘all reasonable effort’ shall be the Government 
and Courts of Justice in Lebanon.”14
There Are More Immediate Ways to Manage Risk
Dramatic progress has been made in risk avoidance over 
the past twenty years. One breakthrough came because of ad-
vances in metal detector technology, which meant that many 
hazards with a minimum-metal content could be reliably lo-
cated. Another was the use of small radio-controlled machines 
to process areas with fragmentation mines before the demin-
ers deployed.15 Then came the use of long-handled rakes for ex-
cavation that used distance to avoid injury when there was an 
anti-personnel blast mine detonation. Today, there is the in-
creasing use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) with high- 
resolution cameras that are able to hover and allow the remote 
inspection of potential hazards before anyone approaches.
Left to right, the images show demining PPE used in Mozambique and Cambodia in 1997.11
Images courtesy of the author.
The images show the PPE currently being used by a demining organization clearing improvised explosive devices (IED) in Syria. In 
the author’s opinion, they are doing everything reasonable to protect their workers both with PPE and with specialist IED training. 
Images courtesy of MAT Kosovo.12
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In the example above in Raqqah, Syria, in February 2018, 
a preliminary camera overview helped to identify access 
routes and make informed decisions about approaches that 
minimized risk to the workers. The skilled pilot then used 
the camera to look through doorways and windows and 
could identify a passive infrared (PIR) triggered IED (in the 
cardboard box with the sensor protruding) before anyone 
approached. The small unmanned aircraft (SUA) gave the or-
ganization an up-to-date overview of the extent of structur-
al damage (a common cause of non-explosive injury), then a 
close-up view of visible suspicious items. They used this in-
formation to make an informed search plan that minimized 
risk to their staff. 
Those conducting any kind of risk management must first 
have had appropriate training and/or experience so that they 
can identify and mitigate risks. Thereafter, managing risk ef-
fectively in HMA relies on having as much information about 
each unique task as possible so that an evidence-based risk 
assessment can be made. The use of SUA in Syria provides 
a good example of extending the knowledge available, im-
proving identification and better mitigating risks in that con-
text. Of course the process does not eliminate risk, but it does 
show an organization making “all reasonable effort” to iden-
tify risks as they plan to avoid casualties. 
Needs
The accident record in the DDAS shows that PPE has been 
worth wearing because it has often reduced the number or 
the severity of the wearer’s injuries. Although we have nev-
er had PPE that could reliably protect against all common 
fragmentation hazards in HMA, we still do not have a way to 
assess the relative effectiveness of existing or new PPE prod-
ucts, which might do better. 
The hierarchy of common disabling injuries resulting 
from demining accidents over the past twenty years has only 
changed because stepping on a mine has become much less 
frequent. As a result, catastrophic damage to hands and eyes 
are now by far the most common severe injuries. Meanwhile, 
fragmentation injuries still cause the most deaths. 
Although there have been no significant advances in dem-
ining PPE over the past twenty years, there has been a reduc-
tion in the IMAS PPE requirement.16 The original 2001 IMAS 
10.30 PPE requirements included the provision of frontal 
throat protection and the wearing of a full-face visor. In 2008, 
these former requirements were downgraded to recommen-
dations.17 The author asked for one of these changes because 
the accident record showed that visors were not being worn 
(or worn correctly) when accidents occurred whereas goggles 
were already being used to good effect.18 The requirement was 
reduced to allow the wearing of goggles but recommended the 
continued use of visors. The downgrading of the requirement 
for throat protection appears to have gone unnoticed because 
almost all demining body armor still has a collar that folds 
back in a blast and protects the wearer’s throat. Nonetheless, 
after the passage of ten years, it is perhaps time that the PPE 
requirements in IMAS 10.30 were revisited.
There are at least four other needs related to PPE that should 
be addressed:
1. To reduce the severity of blast injuries, further improve-
ments in the design of blast resistant hand-tools would 
be beneficial, as would their adoption by organizations 
who have not yet done so (the IMAS recommend their 
use but do not require it). 
2. To reduce eye loss, the invention of a lighter and stron-
ger blast visor material could encourage the correct use 
of visors. This is rumored to have already happened; 
however, the material’s manufacture and use have yet 
to filter down to readily available and affordable dem-
ining PPE.
3. To increase body protection, the development of flex-
ible ceramic armor (e.g., modified Dragon Skin armor) 
or the use of PURE (i.e., the light material used in the 
Images from a small unmanned aircraft (SUA) show the extent of structural damage, then close-up views of visible suspicious 
items. 
Images courtesy of field operatives in Syria.
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ROFI demining face mask) would be worthwhile. This 
armor need not be able to protect against rifle fire (of-
ten approaching 1,000 m/s), but any increase to com-
fort and affordability in deminer protection would be 
an improvement. 
4. To allow end users to compare products, the ability to 
compare one PPE product’s performance against anoth-
er in a low-cost test that replicated an agreed, typical 
demining accident event would encourage manufactur-
ers to make further incremental improvements.
Finally, while the PPE provision has remained fairly static, 
the refinement and development of procedures and equip-
ment that keep people at a distance from the hazards has re-
duced risk to the deminers in many organizations over the 
past 20 years. Alongside the formal conduct of disciplined risk 
assessments, the author believes that the avoidance approach 
of responsible field operatives often demonstrates doing “all 
that is reasonable” to make risk tolerable in spite of the inad-
equacy of the available PPE.19 




A.V.Smith (AVS, Andy Smith) served as a 
PPE specialist on the International Mine 
Action Standards (IMAS) Review Board for 
11 years and was the founder and keep-
er of the DDAS.20 He has worked in hu-
manitarian mine action (HMA) over more 
than 20 years at all levels from surveyor/ 
deminer to Chief Technical Advisor to 
UNDP country programs. Having drafted the original IMAS Technical 
Note for Mine Action on Field Risk Assessment (TNMA), he was 
contracted by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining (GICHD) to produce current field risk assessment training 
materials in 2016.21 
Smith (front) wearing the most commonly used demining PPE in Tajikistan in 2016 – the deminers behind are wearing the ROFI mask.
Images courtesy of Major Firuz Asadbekov, Humanitarian Demining unit, Army of Tajikistan.
The views expressed in articles published in The Journal of Conventional Weapons 
Destruction are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of 
the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of Defense, James Madison 
University, or the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery.
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ENDNOTES
PPE Development and Needs in HMA by Smith [ from page 5]
1. NATO Standardization Agency (STANAG) 2920 PPS (edition 2) Ballistic test method for Personal Armor Materials and Combat Clothing, NSA/0723-PPS/2920, 2003.
2. The author has tested 5mm untreated polycarbonate using NATO STANAG 2920 and found a V50 ranging from 250 m/s to 280 m/s. The uncertain result is probably 
caused by variations in the ambient temperature or in the temperature of the fragments (which were fired using blanks or by compressed air).
3. Hand-tools are included in IMAS 10.30 PPE because the accident record shows that the use of well designed tools can protect the deminer by distance and by avoiding 
parts of the tool separating and causing injury.
4. PURE is a polypropylene self-reinforced composite material: see http://www.ditweaving.com/ 
5. This visor was designed by the author and given freely to the manufacturer: See: Security Devices. “SD Platinum Visor.” Accessed 12 April 2018. https://bit.ly/2vghH7B. 
6. The author was invited to advise during a workshop in Norway at the start of the design process for this mask, but does not like the result. For information about the 
mask, see: Rofi: Protecting People. Accessed 12 April 2018. https://bit.ly/2vghUrp.  
7. European Committee for Standardization (CEN) Workshop Agreement 15756, now defunct.
8. IMAS 10.30, 2nd Edition, amendment 2, “References to CWA for T&E of PPE were removed from Clause1 and Annex A” at the start of 2011.
9. The author was an advisor to the project.
10. From IMAS 04.10, Glossary, 2014. This definition is drawn from the International Standards Organization (ISO) Guide 51:1999(E).
11. Left to right, the pictures show a UNADP deminer in Mozambique a HALO Trust and a MAG deminer in Cambodia.
12. Pictures taken in 2017 during specialist IED clearance training conducted in Syria by PCM ERW Risk Management & MAT Kosovo. www.pcm-erw.com, email: info@
pcm-erw.com. 
13. Lebanon NMAS 04.10 Glossary, February, 2018.
14. Drafted by the LMAC with the author’s input, 2018.
15. The most successful of which in terms of sales is the DOK-ING MV4 made in Croatia (which has also supplied U.S. forces in Afghanistan). 
16. IMAS 10.30 PPE, Edition 1, 2001. “The frontal protection ensemble provided to employees, whether required to kneel, sit or squat shall be designed to cover the eyes, 
throat (frontal neck), chest, abdomen and genitals”.
17. IMAS 10.30 2nd Edition, 2008.
18. As a member of the IMAS Review Board, the author argued for this change because of the lack of injuries sustained while wearing goggles while excavating with rakes. 
The wearing of blast goggles during EOD and IED tasks has since become common, which was not anticipated but the author respects the principle of wearer’s choice 
as long as blast visors are available at the task if they choose to wear them. 
19. For a formal HMA Field Risk Assessment training course, the author recommends the one that he provided some materials for at GICHD. Contact: r.evans@gichd.org
20. Database of Demining Accidents, which is an informative reference in IMAS 10.30, (Annex A) and online at www.ddasonline.com.
21. International Mine Action Standards Technical Note for Mine Action (IMAS TNMA) TN 10.20 20 2009.
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